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II.—ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA.¹

We may repeat of French Platonists and Aristotelians what Plato said of the Athenians—when they are good they are most excellent. Mr. Rodier's laborious edition of the *de Anima* not only supersedes but swallows and assimilates its German and English predecessors, Trendelenburg and Wallace. On every doubtful point he reproduces the opinions of all the ancient commentators, Alexander, Themistius, Simplicius, Philoponos, Sophonias, Priscianus, and the views of all moderns accessible through Zeller or Bursian's *Jahresbericht*. His own judicial summing up is almost always sane and right, and, where erroneous, can always be checked by the evidence which he supplies.

The constitution of the text is conservative. Mr. Rodier reprints with some interpolations of his own to bring it down to date the critical apparatus of Biehl in the Teubner text. He discusses with inexhaustible patience the emendations of Bonitz, Torstrik, Essen, Bywater, Christ, Kampe, Susemihl, Barco, Wilson, Freudenthal and others, but whenever they involve extensive alterations of the text or venturesome theories of double recensions or interpolation, he finally waves them aside. To minor corrections that seem to restore the sense by a change of punctuation or the altering of a letter or word, he is more favorable, and contributes a few such of his own suggestion. He has made a new collation of E without gleaning much. Following are the chief points of interest in his text :

403, b 17, he retains with E and Biehl the impossible οὔτε ὡς χωριστά. Cf. p. 152.

404, a 19, he deletes comma after εἴρηται, which he renders strangely 'on fait remarquer.'

404, b 10-11, he inserts commas before ταύτας and ταύτην to the improvement of the sense.

407, b 28, he retains in spite of Bernays λόγους δ' ὥσπερ εὐθύνας δεδωκυῖα which he tries to justify by the translation 'qui a déjà eu à fournir ses raisons pour ainsi dire en guise de châtiment.'

¹ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ψυχῆς. 'Aristote Traité De L'Âme.' Traduit et Annoté par G. Rodier. Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1900.

409, b 20-24, he incloses *οἱ . . . σχεδόν* in parentheses and inserts a colon after *ἄλλων*.

410, a 29, he separates *καὶ πρὸς* by commas, translating 'en outre.' Cf. *infra* p. 153. The inserted footnote calling attention to this has got mixed with Biehl's note on Torstrik's emendation so as to make it appear that this punctuation and not Torstrik's reading rests on Sophonias.

412, a 16, he retains the perhaps unnecessarily explicit reading *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιονδὶ τοῦτο*.

417, b 6, he keeps *εἰς αὐτὸ* where *εἰς αὐτὸ* is better suited to the sense. In actualization the thing moves, if it can be said to move, to its (real) self. Mr. Rodier's 'en lui' can hardly be got out of his text.

426, a 27, he reads with Simplicius and Plutarch *εἰ δὲ συμφωνία φωνῇ τίς ἐστιν* for *εἰ δ' ἡ* and renders strangely 'comme une certaine espèce de voix est accord.' Cf. *infra*, p. 159.

427, a 10, he keeps with Biehl *ἢ μία ἢ δύο*, suggesting, however, *ἢ μία ἢ δύο* which, though harsh, gives the required sense.

428, a 24, *φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως . . . φαντασία ἂν εἴη διὰ τε ταῦτα καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ἢ δόξα ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἐστὶν οὐ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις*. So Mr. Rodier prints, connecting *διὰ τε ταῦτα* with what precedes. The lack of any construction for *τε* seems to give him no concern, though he lightly remarks that we might read *γε*. Something is wrong. If one cared to emend, the whole could be smoothed out either by dropping *δῆλον* or reading *ὅτι δῆλον ὅτι*, and, though this is not indispensable, changing *ἐστιν* to *ἔσται*. Two reasons will then be alleged against the identification of *δόξα* and *αἴσθησις*, the foregoing *διὰ τε ταῦτα*, and also the fact that it involves the (intolerable) supposition that the object of *δόξα* and *αἴσθησις* is the same, which he proceeds to refute. Below, 428, b 8, Mr. Rodier retains the vexatious parenthesis *ἀλλὰ ψευδὴς ἐγίνετο, ὅτε λάθοι μεταπεσὼν τὸ πρᾶγμα* of which he gives precisely the explanation tentatively proposed at the end of Wallace's note, remarking at the same time that Wallace's corrections are unnecessary.

429, b 7, he accepts Bywater's excellent suggestion *δι' αὐτοῦ*.

429, b 13, cf. *infra*, p. 155.

430, b 17, in place of *ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδιαίρετα* he proposes and reads *ἄλλη ἀδιαίρετα*, which makes the sentence read smoothly, but leaves the connection with the following hopelessly obscure, a fact which he tries to disguise by a long explanatory parenthesis in the translation. The general meaning of Aristotle is plain enough, but the

wording is desperate and can be cured only by rewriting the passage.

430, b 25, he retains τῶν αἰτίων which Zeller (Aristotle, Trans. vol. II, p. 105) plausibly explains as a blundering dittography of ἐναντίον.

The not infrequent anacolutha of the *de Anima* and the hopeless passages which could be cured only by extensive changes, Mr. Rodier generally leaves, after discussion, translating them defiantly according to his final judgment of the general meaning.

The translation which accompanies the text is almost always right, and in precision and definiteness is, barring a few slips, a great improvement on Wallace. An extensive use of the bracket disfigures the page, but distinguishes most helpfully the literal version from the additions demanded by French idiom, or inserted to bring out the sequence of thought as conceived by Mr. Rodier. The following are the chief passages where he seems to have erred, or where at least difference of opinion is permissible: 402, b 8, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο κατηγοροῖτο—'et de même tout autre attribut commun que l'on pourrait en affirmer.' *En* is misleading. The question, as Alexander rightly takes it, relates to any predicate that is used as a general term, not merely to any other general predicate of ζῶον.

402, b 22, ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἔξομέν τι λέγειν κάλλιστα. Here κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν does not mean 'd'une façon conforme à ce que l'expérience manifeste,' but simply 'in sensuous presentation.' Wallace's 'to the mind's eye' is substantially right, though it errs in implying that the presentation must be always representation. Κατὰ is probably used somewhat as in καθ' ἑαυτὸν (*apud animum*) ζητεῖν; or as in 427, b 23, κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι. Mr. Rodier argues that the logic requires his rendering. Aristotle, he thinks, could not mean to say that the essence can be inferred from the συμβεβηκότα. He means that the possibility of explaining (ἀποδιδόναι) the συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτὰ from the essence is an *a posteriori* confirmation that the essence has been correctly defined. Otherwise, too, the following γὰρ is pointless. This is hypercritical. The passage is one of many in which Aristotle states that the definition is often best approached through a survey of particulars. (Zeller, Eng. Trans. I. 172). This process is virtually if not strictly induction (Zeller, I. 269). The καὶ of τότε καὶ and the future ἔξομεν are inex-

plicable on Mr. Rodier's interpretation. The γάρ that follows in πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τί ἐστίν did not trouble Simplicius (15. 9) and need not us. It loosely assigns the reason for the emphasis laid on κάλλιστα. The sequence is: (and it is important to define οὐσία well) *for the what is it* is the starting point of all proofs and (here we have Mr. Rodier's idea) definitions that are not accompanied by concrete knowledge of the accidents, are empty and verbal. There is no real difficulty in the unprecise use of ἀποδιδόναι (cf. 406, a 27), and we need not introduce the distinction between συμβεβηκότα and καθ' αὐτὰ συμβεβηκότα.

403, b 17, ἐλέγομεν δ' ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὔτε ὡς χωριστὰ τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζώων, ἢ δὴ τοιαῦθ' ὑπάρχει, θυμὸς καὶ φόβος, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον. It is a pity that Mr. Rodier follows Biehl's text here which drives him to a forced unnatural translation inconsistent with his punctuation. Οὔτε ὡς and καὶ οὐχ are impossible correlates here. Obviously we must read with the majority of MSS and editors οὐ χωριστὰ or ἀχώριστα. The meaning is that the πάθη, *qua* such; i. e. *qua*, e. g., θυμὸς and φόβος, are ἀχώριστα, inseparable, even in thought from their material embodiment, and not like the line which *qua* line is separable in thought from physical matter. This is the interpretation of Simplicius (whose reference of τοιαῦτα Mr. Rodier misunderstands), and of Themistius. It is easy, though not necessary, to read γε, instead of δὴ, with U and Simplicius.

404, b 21, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως: 'Platon dit aussi.' The name of Plato should not be mentioned in connection with these fooleries of Xenocrates except where Aristotle explicitly attributes them to him.—405, a 16 γυν: 'en conséquence'; rather: at any rate.—405, b 26, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν. May not this mean not that they 'raisonnent d'après les noms,' but that they etymologize to suit their respective theories? The phrasing of Cratylus, 436, b, εἴ τις . . . ἀκολουθοῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι seems against it, but the general tenor of the discussion in the Cratylus favors it, and διὸ καὶ is certainly clearer so. Their physical theories are no reason for their etymologizing, but do explain the particular etymologies in which they seek support for the respective doctrines.

406, b 2, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα: in spite of the Greek commentators may this not mean 'within the body' rather than 'comme le corps'? This gives point to the following antithesis: (if it can move *in* the body) it would follow that it can also, καὶ, go forth from the body and return. The same thought

seems to be implied in the comparison on the next page with the quicksilver which the Daedalus of Philippos poured into his wooden Aphrodite.—407, b 1, *εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς μὴ οὐσία* can not of course be construed 'si le mouvement est la negation de l'essence de l'âme,' but in loose writing 'if movement is *not* its essence' may be treated as the logical equivalent of Mr. Rodier's version.

409, a 21, *εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἕτεραι αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι μονάδες καὶ αἱ στιγμαί* —'si en outre, l'on prétend que les unités [psychiques qui résident] dans le corps sont différentes des points,' etc., *αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι μονάδες* are not the psychic unities but the spatial points, as Themistius clearly explains. It is much more credible that Aristotle should have used *μονάδες* and *στιγμαί* interchangeably as he appears to do throughout the passage, than that he should repeatedly employ *ἐν τῷ σώματι* in contrary senses.—410, a 29, *καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν.* Mr. Rodier's solution of this *crux* is to place a comma after *καὶ πρὸς* which he renders 'en outre.' This is ingenious but very abrupt and harsh, though Mr. Rodier might have quoted Plato *Repub.* 559 A for a similar position of *καὶ πρὸς*. The note affirms that the expression *προσ-ματυρεῖν* (sic) *τινα* is Greek in the sense 'témoigner avec quelqu'un.' One would like to see his authority.

411, a 18, *καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῇ τοῖς μορίοις εἶναι*: 'que l'âme qui réside dans les parties est (dans chacune d'elles) de même nature.' Rather: that the soul (the general soul of the air, etc.) is homogeneous with its parts (as they are found in animals, etc.). See the explanation of Themistius who apparently claims to be the first to understand the passage: *ταύτης τῆς λέξεως ὅτι μὴ κατεκράτησαν οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν.*

411, a 19, *ὁ μὲν ἀὴρ διασπώμενος* is not 'l'air respiré,' but, as Wallace correctly renders, 'air when divided.'

412, b 15, *νῦν δ' ἐστὶ πέλεκυς* the interpretation of Simplicius followed by Mr. Rodier 'mais, en fait, la hache existe' seems to yield the more plausible sequence. But the natural construction of the Greek makes rather for that of Themistius and Alexander: 'but in point of fact it's only an axe'—not an organic body.—414, b 25, *διὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος λόγος οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκείον καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν τοιοῦτον.* The Greek commentators differ and the text will always be doubtful. But the general interpretation of Themistius and Pacius is surely right that Aristotle means: 'it is absurd to seek (any other) general definition of souls or triangles

if you reject the type of general definition that I have given of the soul—*τὸν τοιοῦτον*.' It is impossible to construe with Mr. Rodier *οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκείον*, etc., 'et de ne pas s'attacher a ce qui appartient en propre et à l'espèce indivisible.' Mr. Rodier's argument that this phrase must point to *ὥστε καθ' ἑκαστον ζητητέον* below is not convincing. The intervening sentence, *παραπλησίως δ' ἔχει*, etc., opens a new aspect of the question.

424, b 13, *animés* is by inadvertence for *inanimés*.—425, a 15, *ὡν ἑκάστη αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. Mr. Rodier rightly rejects Torstrick's *οὐ* before *κατὰ*, and follows the Greek commentators in understanding the words to express not Aristotle's opinion but a part of the objection. Below, *ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα*, he interprets *κινήσει* 'par le mouvement qu'elle provoque en nous.' This, the explanation of Themistius and Simplicius, yields the smoothest sequence of thought, but strains the arts of interpretation to carry through consistently. Mr. Rodier shows that the Greek commentators agree with him, and that that Physics 211, a 12, cited by Trendelenburg is irrelevant. But when it comes to *τὸ δ' ἡρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι* he inconsistently rejects the explanation of Philoponos that *τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι* means 'by the unaltered persistence of the subjective state', and, reverting to the view which he has just rejected for the passage as a whole, says, 'peut-être Aristote veut-il dire plus simplement que le repos est perçu comme privation du mouvement.' It is a difficult question. The unanimity of the Greek commentators counts heavily. And it is true that Aristotle does not elsewhere deduce all the common sensibles from motion. But there is no inconsistency in supposing *κίνησις* to be the *ratio cognoscendi* of concepts, some of which are ontologically prior to it. The view of the Greek commentators may be due to the attempt to find here an explicit proof of what Aristotle merely asserts below that our perception of the *κοινά* is not accidental. Certainly the natural construction of the Greek is to take *κίνησις* as meaning simply (perception of) motion.

425, b 12, sqq. The difficult passage on consciousness of perception is in the main rightly explained, Zeller's misinterpretation (Trans. 2. 69 n. 3) being silently corrected. Mr. Rodier perfunctorily repeats from Bonitz and Trendelenburg at 425, b 22, the reference to Charmides 168 DE, but does not seem to perceive the indebtedness of the entire passage to Plato. Its two leading thoughts are: (1) the paradox of a faculty exercised upon itself (Charmides 167 sqq.); (2) the psychological regress *ad infinitum*

Theaetet. 200 C). In one point this oversight affects the interpretation: *ἡ εἰς ἄπειρον εἰσιν ἡ αὐτὴ τις ἔσται αὐτῆς* is rendered, 'ou bien ce second sens devra se sentir elle-même.' And in the notes (p. 265) Mr. Rodier objects to Philoponos' *ἀτοπον τὸ αὐτὴν ἐαυτῆς αἰσθησιν εἶναι* on the ground that it is not a second *ἀτοπον*, but the real opinion of Aristotle. But the Charmides passage would have made him feel more fully the force of *τις* and the future *ἔσται*. It is an *ἀτοπον* that we should have to admit a faculty that perceives itself, but it is better to accept this *ἀτοπον* at the beginning of the series than later, since we can escape it only by an infinite regress.

427, b 17, Mr. Rodier's solution of the *εἴτε δ' οὐκ ἔστιν [ἡ] αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις* is to bracket *ἡ* with Schneider and render 'qu'elle (sc. *φαντασία*) ne soit ni la pensée ni la croyance.' This is impossible. The one thing certain is that Aristotle here means to distinguish *φαντασία* from *ὑπόληψις*. We have the choice of dropping *νόησις* and inserting *φαντασία* from the margin of U, or of taking *νόησις* as a loose synonym of *φαντασία*. The latter is by no means impossible. For *ὑπόληψις* here is not, as often, used of the higher intellect generally, but of belief as opposed to mere presentation. Now, much as *φαντασία* and *νόησις* differ for other purposes, for this argument they are alike, in that both are mere representations which, unlike belief, can be summoned up at will. It is thus careless writing to substitute *νόησις* for *φαντασία*, but not too careless for Aristotle perhaps. But it is incredible that *νόησις* and *ὑπόληψις* should be virtually identified in opposition to *φαντασία* in a passage which emphasizes the aspect of *ὑπόληψις* that is antithetic to *φαντασία* and *νόησις* alike. It is no objection that later *φαντασία* in another sense is treated as a state that admits both truth and error.

429, b 13, *τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα καὶ ἡ ἄλλῃ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει*. Mr. Rodier follows Biehl in retaining *καὶ*, the impossibility of which he vainly disguises by the rendering 'c'est aussi par des facultés différentes.' In what follows he assumes that Aristotle is speaking of three things: (1) sense to judge sensibles; (2) intellect in one attitude for concepts involving matter; (3) intellect otherwise modified for pure concepts. But Aristotle has not yet decided, if he ever does decide, that the pure intellect is separable. The alternative of *ἄλλῃ* and *ἄλλως ἔχοντι*, then, applies to the cognition of sensibles and intelligibles as well as to the two kinds of intelligibles. We have not three choices, but two repeated in two planes. Zeller (Trans. 2. 93) has shown that there is no

objection to speaking of νοῦς as in a certain sense apprehending αἰσθητά.

429, b 29, ἡ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἐστὶ τὰ νοητά ὁ νοῦς, etc.—‘que nous avons distingué plus haut la passion qui s'exerce grâce à une communauté [entre l'agent et le patient de celle qu'on peut attribuer à l'intellect.]' This perhaps roughly gives the sense for practical purposes, but διήρηται can hardly be so used of distinguishing one thing from another. Render rather: or have we distinguished two senses of πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι, etc. The reference is to 417, b 1-17. Here instead of explicitly naming the two senses: (1) the proper sense; (2) the passage from δύναμις to ἐνέργεια, he merely reminds us that the πάσχειν of νοῦς in relation to νοητά falls under the second head in that the νοῦς is potentially the νοητά. This is virtually the interpretation of Brentano, that of Simplicius which Mr. Rodier supposes to be different, and of Themistius. For the κοινόν τι cf. 405, b 20, and 433, a 22.—431, b 8, καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει—‘et lorsqu'il a prononcé que là est l'agréable,’ etc. This is a very forced and un-Aristotelian construction of the Greek. ὡς ἐκεῖ, as Simplicius takes it, plainly means ‘as there,’ in the field of sense perception, as contrasted with ἐνταῦθα, where thought is dealing with representative images. In view of Aristotle's elliptic style, Torstrik's addition of τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν after ἐνταῦθα is unnecessary though it gives the sense.—432, b 4, καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τοῦτο διασπᾶν does not mean ‘de séparer . . . des autres,’ but ‘to split up, divide up.’—435, b 12, ἀ τῇ ἀφῇ φθείρει, not ‘qui seraient pernicieuses pour le toucher,’ ‘but which destroy by contact.’

The purpose of the commentary is to elucidate Aristotle's meaning and justify the translation, sentence by sentence. Its two chief features are the extensive illustration of Aristotle's terminology and the full presentation of the views of other commentators, ancient and modern. In the first respect Mr. Rodier, like the generality of modern interpreters, has been tempted by the convenience of Bonitz' index into an excess of merely lexicographical illustration, where a brief reference to Zeller or Bonitz would have sufficed. The citations from the Greek commentators are interesting and helpful, especially those from Alexander and Themistius, who were very sensible, intelligent fellows. But one grudges the space assigned to the moderns, and regrets that Mr. Rodier could not have devoted to the discussion of the

philosophic problems involved in his text, some of the pages wasted in rejecting with sad civility the wanton emendations of Torstrik, for example. It is true Mr. Rodier explicitly disavows the purpose of dealing with the larger philosophic problems of the book, but in a commentary of nearly six hundred pages on a philosophical text there should surely be some room for philosophy. The *de Anima* is a treatise on psychology. Its difficulties are by no means exclusively philological, caused by the uncertainty of the text, the loss of much contemporary literature, the peculiarities of Aristotle's terminology, the exasperating carelessness of his style. They are due quite as much to the fact that Aristotle did not and could not know his own mind—that he was struggling with problems that have not yet been solved, and to which he was precluded from giving a coherent answer by the fundamental inconsistency that runs through his entire system. The purely empiric conception of knowledge and the origin of general ideas employed in the *Organon* and as a basis for the polemic against Plato was from the start hopelessly irreconcilable with the transcendental presuppositions that were to find their ultimate expression in the doctrine of a definition that expresses the metaphysical unity of essence, of forms somehow separable from matter, of energy divorced from all taint of potentiality, of an agent that does not touch, though the patient is touched, of a motor that does not move, of a passive intellect that is the mere potentiality of thought, and yet is neither sense nor imagination, of an active reason that thinks always in pure forms and yet operates to actualize the passive reason of a finite mind inseparable from the bodily organism. Again and again as Aristotle finds himself on the verge of this gulf of inconsistencies he shies off violently, postpones his decision, and resumes the interminable discussion of *ἀπορίας*. This is probably the reason why he never completed his system in the direction to which all the lines inevitably converge by distinctly identifying the *νοῦς ποιητικός* with the divine mind regarded as the abode and sum of all Platonic ideas. Mr. Rodier, like Zeller, admits in general terms the rift of inconsistency that runs through the Aristotelian philosophy.¹ But, like Zeller, he is apt to deal with each particular passage as if it were unaffected by this fundamental fact. In each case he is so bent upon smoothing away difficulties and showing the essential reasonableness of the Aristotelian standpoint that he often

¹ See Preface, and the note on the *νοῦς* problem, pp. 28–30.

leaves the impression that there is no final insoluble residuum of inconsistency and confusion. This is notably the case in his remarks on the reality of the general notion (pp. 18-19), on the problem of the unity of the definition (177, 475), on the identity of a thing and its *τί ἦν εἶναι*,¹ on the reconciliation of the doctrine of a separable soul with the dependence of thought upon imagination (453), on the relation of the *νοῦς ποιητικός* to God and the Platonic ideas. In these and many other cases the only adequate commentary would be one that related Aristotle to Plato on the one hand, and to modern psychology on the other. The explicit references to Plato, as e. g. that to the *ψυχογονία*, are amply illustrated by Mr. Rodier. A few examples of less obvious connections of thought may be given here. The discussion of the relation of matter and form in the definition in 403, b, and 412, should be illustrated by Cratylus 389, which is the chief source of this important Aristotelian idea, as will appear also by a comparison of *de part. an.* 640 b. The entire substance of the doctrine is already in Plato—the determination of the essence by the function or use, the equivocal use of form to denote both logical essence and physical shape, the necessity that such a form or essence should find its embodiment in a particular and appropriate matter.—In 405, a 4, *τό τε γὰρ κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρώτων ὑπειλήφασιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως. ὅθεν ἔδοξέ τισι πῦρ εἶναι* probably refers to the discussion in *Leges* 892, and particularly to the words (892 C), *φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα. εἰ δὲ φανήσεται ψυχὴ πρῶτον οὐ πῦρ*, etc. In 409, b 31, *ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίτι γνωριεῖ ἢ αἰσθήσεται*; the thought that knowledge of the elements of a thing will not by simple mechanical addition yield knowledge of the composite whole goes back to the discussion of the syllable and its *στοιχεῖα* in *Theaetet.* 203 sqq. This passage made a strong impression upon Aristotle as appears from many veiled and some explicit allusions in his writings: e. g. *Met.* 1043, b 5, *οὐ φαίνεται δὴ ζητοῦσιν ἢ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὐσα καὶ συνθέσεως*. The whole is more than the sum of its parts in the case of qualities or psychological states. As Professor James says (*Psychology* 1. 160), "There would be a hundred and first feeling then, if when a group or series were set a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge."—The statement in 414, b 20, that a general definition of soul is as void as a general definition of *σχῆμα*

¹ P. 443, in citing *Met.* 1032, a 8, *καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτει εἶναι*, he omits *καὶ εἰ*!

was probably suggested by Meno 74 E, τί ἐστι τοῦτο . . ὃ δὲ ὀνομά-
 ζεις σχῆμα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῆς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ.—In
 415, a 29, the idea that generation is a striving of the mortal to
 put on immortality ἵνα τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχωσιν ἢ δύνανται needs
 illustration from its source, Symp. 207 D, 208 B. In 418, a 20,
 and 425, a 26, the apparent reversal of the normal use of κατὰ συμ-
 βεβηκός by which a substance is made the accident of a distantly
 perceived quality, τοῦτω δὲ συμβέβηκεν νῖφ Κλέωνος εἶναι, was probably
 suggested by the psychological analysis in Philebus 38 D of the
 errors that arise in the perception of a distant object.—In 418,
 a 30, the peculiar use of καθ' αὐτό, not in its logical sense, but of
 an object the color of which belongs to it, is probably to be traced
 in the last resort to the discussion in Lysis 217 CD of the cases in
 which the παρουσία of the color does or does not imply real color-
 ing. Cf. καθὸ in Met. 1022, a 15–18, and καθ' αὐτό ὡς ἐπιφάνεια
 λευκόν in Met. 1029, b 17.—In 420, b 19, the distinction between
 the ἀναγκαῖον of taste and the εἶδ of speech comes from Timaeus 75 E.

In the difficult passage 426, b 3, sqq. a reference to the Philebus
 is needed, not merely for illustration, but to give the true mean-
 ing. Aristotle apparently argues that αἴσθησις is a proportion or
 ratio (λόγος) for the reason (1) that certain forms of sensation are
 evidently so as e. g. the sensation of a συμφωνία, and (2) because
 excess destroys the sensation. He adds, speaking of various
 qualities of sight, smell and taste: διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μὲν ὅταν εἰλικρινῇ καὶ
 ἀμυγῇ ὄντα αἰγῆται εἰς τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ ἀλμυρόν, ἡδέα γὰρ
 τότε ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ μικτὸν συμφωνία ἢ τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ τὸ βαρύν. ἀφ᾽ ἧ δὲ τὸ
 θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκτόν. ἢ δ' αἴσθησις ὁ λόγος. ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λυπεῖ ἢ
 φθείρει. I do not think that certainty is attainable with regard to
 the last three lines. But the general meaning of the passage, and
 the special force of ἡδέα μὲν which has been generally misunder-
 stood appear only by comparison with Philebus 51 C–53 B. There Plato argues that there is a natural pleasure attached to
 pure unmixed sensations of tone, color, and the like, employing
 the terms καθαρόν, εἰλικρινές, etc. As compared with these he dis-
 parages 'mixed' sensations, purposely perhaps confounding the
 mixture of pleasure and pain with the mixture of different qualities
 of sense. Alluding to this Aristotle says: 'the sensations are, it
 is true (μὲν concessive), pleasurable when they are presented
 εἰλικρινῇ καὶ ἀμυγῇ to the sense which being itself a λόγος perceives
 and judges their purity; but in general ὅλως δὲ there is more
 pleasure in a harmoniously mixed sensation, the ratios and pro-

portions of which are perceived by sense as it perceives a συμφωνία. The correlate of ἡδέα μὲν is ὅλως δέ not ὑπερβάλλοντα δέ as Mr. Rodier seems to say, p. 377. ἄγεται εἰς τὸν λόγον means 'are presented to the sense' (which is a λόγος), not 'elles sont amenées à s'unir dans la proportion voulue.' Wallace so far misapprehends the thought that he actually cites to prove that ἀλμυρόν is a mixture, a passage (Meteorolog. 358-9) in which Aristotle says that the salt taste of sea water is due to an intermixture of solid particles with the water. It is idle to dogmatize about the last three lines. The sentence begins as if Aristotle meant to say: 'but generally speaking the mixed is more pleasurable.' συμφωνία may be an interpolation, or we may read something like εἰ συμφωνία or ἐν συμφωνία ὃν or ὥσπερ συμφωνία. The words ἢ τὸ ὀξύ ἢ τὸ βαρύ may mean than the (unmixed) acute or grave, or possibly, which better suits the required sense, they and the following τὸ θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκτὸν may be loosely appended alternative examples of the constituents of pleasurable mixtures. In any case the key to the whole is (1) the Philebus passage; (2) the idea that sense is a kind of λόγος, both in the pleasurable perception of the purity of pure qualities, and, despite Plato, in the still more pleasurable perception of the proportions of a harmonious blend.—In 428, a 12, the, to a modern, surprising statement αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς is due to a reminiscence of Philebus 40 AB, where φαντάσματα is used of imaginative pictures of hope and desire, and it is added that for the wicked such pictures are generally false, i. e. not destined to be realized.

Many other minor illustrations might be drawn from the psychological parts of the Philebus, Theaetetus, Phaedo, Republic, Sophist and Timaeus. But I prefer to give the space that remains to a typical ἀπορία that originating in certain passages of the Parmenides and Charmides¹ runs all through the *de Anima*. It is the ever-recurring metaphysical problem of devising any theory of communication between matter and a totally disparate mind, that does not break down the distinction between them.

The first hint of it appears in the criticism of Anaxagoras' νοῦς ἀμύγης 405, b 22. It is employed somewhat sophistically in the polemic against the psychology of the world soul of the Timaeus interpreted with matter of fact literalness 407, a 10-12. In 409, b 5, it is invoked against the theory that the soul is a monad or a point. If such points are identical with those of the body all

¹ Parmen. 132 C, Charm. 167-8.

bodies must possess souls. In 410, a 16-18, it is again touched upon in the discussion of the general theory that the soul is made up of the elements of things. It is repeated again against Empedocles in 410, b 8, and lurks in the objection that his god, the Sphaeros, will be more ignorant than the finite beings that are acquainted with strife, an objection which, as Mr. Rodier observes, applies with equal force to Aristotle's God, and which, he does not observe, was suggested by the Parmenides. [134 D 'Αρ' οὐν οἷός τε αὐτῷ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν γινώσκειν;] It reappears 425, b 19, in the question whether if there is a sense that sees (is conscious of) sight, sight itself must not be colored, and in the problem, 427 a, of how unity can be aware of multiplicity and difference. Lastly, it culminates in the ἀπορία of 429, b 26 sqq., where Aristotle raises the question, what is the relation of νοῦς conceived as itself intelligible (νοητός) to things, to *cognita*. If it is νοητός solely in virtue of being νοῦς, then all νοητά must possess νοῦς. If it is νοητός in virtue of some other quality which it possesses in common with other νοητά, then it is no longer "gesondert ungemischt und nur sich selber gleich." His solution is that *cognita* and νοητά are of two kinds: (1) pure forms in the case of which thought and its object coincide and the question disappears; (2) forms immersed in matter. In the latter the νοητόν has only a potential existence before the realizing activity of νοῦς, and such a potential νοητόν does not involve the presence of νοῦς. Thought, therefore, may be an intelligible, though all intelligibles need not possess thought.

This purely verbal evasion Mr. Rodier seems to accept as satisfactory and requiring no further comment. But the problem, as we have seen, has a history, and Aristotle's failure to solve it has a reason. It is substantially identical with and was probably suggested by the cavil against the Platonic ideas put in the mouth of Parmenides. 132 C, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τὰλλα φησὶ τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖν σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; On the surface this is a mere sophistical quibble, but it distinctly raises the epistemological problem of the Aristotelian passage. Aristotle's pure forms, whether he knows it or not, are Platonic ideas, and he has the further embarrassment that they are not like the Platonic ideas, all-inclusive, but leave outside their circle an indeterminate and inexplicable residuum of forms or ideas more or less universal in matter, the psychological and ontological status of which his system was unable to define. If thought

is conceived in pure isolation and qualitative distinction from 'things,' how can it in any way apprehend them? And if there is a qualitative likeness or partial identity, then must not all things think in some degree, and is not the absolute barrier broken down? Monistic, hylozoistic, pantheistic philosophies frankly accept the second alternative. They boldly affirm with Diogenes of Apollonia that the air thinks, with Parmenides that the corpse is aware of darkness and silence, with Empedocles that all things have a part in knowledge and perception, with Shelley that 'every grain is sentient.' This is repugnant to common sense. But philosophers who appeal to common sense find the line very hard to draw. Wundt and Riehl, for example, in our own day, after accepting the parallelism of the two aspect theory for the relation of mind and body, extend it to animals, then in a sense to plants, and so are finally confronted with the question whether there may not be a subjective 'side' to every atom. Aristotle, always a champion of common sense, could not entertain such a thought. Yet his incoherent system provided him with no real defense against it. The Platonic ideas banished in the *Organon* were returning in the shape of a dimly conceived, active, intellect or divine mind, identical with its own thoughts. The only consistent issue would have been to make these thoughts include all general notions, the abstract reflection or duplication of everything, and to make the divine mind immanent in the universe. Just as Plato rejected the notion that there was anything too lowly to have an idea, so Aristotle was logically bound to admit that the most trivial reality or transient relation was capable of verbal formulation, and consequently of intelligible conception as mere essence and *τί ἦν εἶναι*. And on this view the divine mind identical with its own thoughts would be thinking in everything. I attribute no such doctrine to Aristotle. I am merely showing that the distinctions by which he sought to evade it were either purely verbal or implied a psychology which he would not accept and could not consistently apply. He undoubtedly endeavored to limit the pure ideas or essences by a theory akin to Mill's doctrine of 'natural kinds.' He would admit logical essence, *τί ἦν εἶναι*, and definition in the strict sense only of natural species or (for on this point neither he nor his disciples have ever been clear), of the individuals belonging to them. But this limitation inevitably breaks down. Events, as eclipses, e. g. are more significant for the theory of the definition than the things of

natural kinds. Abstract nouns expressive of relations and qualities are for many purposes quite as pure ideas as those that express the essence of a species. To say that they are *εὐθὺς ὅπερ ὄν τι* is a mere evasion of the final question as to their ontological status. So of the distinction between pure forms and those that involve matter. The real and the verbal classification constantly cross one another. It is a mere accident of language that in *σιμός* the implication of a particular matter is thrust upon the attention more prominently than in *κοῖλος* or *καμπυλότης*. But if, as Aristotle repeatedly says, the mind can never think *ἄνευ φαντάσματος*, the implication of the matter is always present. And as a matter of fact Aristotle was never able to specify the ideas that can be thought as pure form, or to determine the content of the divine, self-thinking thought. If the divine mind could only think 'natural kinds' its range of knowledge would be far more limited than that of the Empedoclean god which Aristotle censured on this score. And if the *νοῦς ποιητικός* could think only 'natural kinds' how on Aristotelian principles could it actualize in the passive mind the potentiality of thinking all other abstractions? There is no escape on these lines from a reinstatement of all Platonic ideas in a universal and immanent mind.

Even if we waive all this, the second half of Aristotle's explanation brings back the puzzle in another form. Ideas involving matter have only a potential existence in the material things, he says. This is absolutely satisfactory to common sense, but the convenient evasion 'potentially' will not bear analysis. The problem is: if thought thinks all things must it not be in some sense coextensive with all things? No, replies Aristotle, for the *abstracta* (the Forms) of mere qualities and mathematical relations (as distinguished from essences proper) do not dwell in the material object except potentially. It is the active mind that educes them and makes them actual. But waiving the point already made that the active mind can not actualize thoughts which by hypothesis it does not itself think, we still ask how is the contact effected. 'The stone is not in the soul' (*οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*). Neither is the *νοῦς* in the stone. If the *νοῦς* enters the stone, or the stone, in Platonic phrase, *μετέχει*, participates in the *νοῦς*; why does not the stone think? If, on the other hand, the stone, or the Form of the stone, finds its way into the mind by the psychological process described in *Analytica Posteriora* II 15, then we have the purely sensualistic psychology which Hobbes

learned from Aristotle, 'physics becomes first philosophy,' all talk of a separable *νοῦς*, of pure forms, and of an 'active mind' becomes meaningless, and the alternative before us is as in modern times materialism or some form of Berkeleian idealism. 'Potential' is a good word to conjure with, but it explains nothing, as Aristotle himself sometimes appears to be uneasily aware. And it is time that the historians of Greek philosophy abandoned the habit of breaking Plato's metaphors on the logical wheel, while at the same time they allow 'common sense' to select a plausible body of Aristotelian doctrine from two inconsistent and irreconcilable psychologies.

However metaphysical and remote from the solid ground of philological method such considerations may appear, they are indispensable to the interpretation of either Plato or Aristotle. And we cannot escape them by Sprachstatistik, collation of manuscripts, or respectful discussion of the emendations of Torstrik.

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